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INTRODUCTION
Professor Rafael I. Pardo has done much to advance our
understanding of the student loan discharge process and the hurdles that
student loan debtors must surmount in order to obtain relief. In a series
of three earlier articles, he reviewed student loan discharge attempts and
found that legally irrelevant considerations play a significant role in
whether debtors receive a discharge.1
In his latest piece, The Undue Hardship Thicket: On Access to Justice,
Procedural Noncompliance, and Pollutive Litigation in Bankruptcy,

* Ph.D. Candidate in Politics, Princeton University; J.D., Harvard Law School. Thanks
to Madison Kilbride, Lynn LoPucki, Katherine Porter, and Michael Simkovic for valuable
comments on this response.
1. See Rafael I. Pardo, Illness and Inability to Repay: The Role of Debtor Health in the
Discharge of Educational Debt, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 505, 517 (2008) (explaining that “of the
three most prevalent factors (i.e., the debtor’s health status, monthly household income, and
monthly household expenses), only a debtor’s health status had a statistically significant
association with legal outcome”); Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan
Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 179, 185 (2009) [hereinafter
Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal] (noting that “factors unrelated to the command
of the law” account for the disparate treatment of student loan debtors); Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle
R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts: An Empirical Assessment of the Discharge
of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 405, 433 (2005) (noting that “the law has not treated
student loan debtors uniformly”).
377
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Pardo once again tackles the subject of student loan litigation.2 This time,
however, he examines the other party to the dispute—the student loan
creditor. Specifically, Pardo makes a compelling case that student loan
creditors have an advantage over individual debtors in the litigation
process.3 Using Educational Credit Management Corporation (ECMC) as
a case study, he presents an illuminating look at some of the litigation
tactics that student loan creditors can use to tilt the field in their favor.4
Pardo, however, uses the evidence of ECMC’s illegitimate tactics to
present a view of the student loan landscape that is far too dire; he depicts
a system in which debtors are faced with almost insurmountable accessto-justice barriers.5 Pardo is correct in his assertion that student loan
debtors are at a disadvantage compared to their creditors, but the situation
is not as hopeless as he suggests. Quite simply, the data do not support
his pessimism regarding the ability of debtors to discharge their student
loans.
In the 2012 edition of the American Bankruptcy Law Journal, I
published a study that examined a nationwide sample of student loan
discharge proceedings.6 The data showed that, although discharging
student loans is not easy, it is far less difficult than scholars have long
maintained. Nearly 40% of debtors who attempted to discharge their
student loans were at least partially successful.7 Despite this success rate,
less than 0.1% of student loan debtors who filed for bankruptcy sought a
discharge.8 This figure is even more concerning in light of the fact that
many of the 99.9% of debtors who did not seek discharges found
themselves in financial positions that were just as bad as the debtors who
successfully obtained discharges.9 This finding led me to conclude that
the most significant problem with the undue hardship standard is that
almost no one attempts to satisfy it.
In his article, Pardo undertook an in-depth review of my study and
questioned its findings.10 Although many of Pardo’s concerns are
thoughtfully presented, they ultimately miss their mark. In this piece, I
respond on two counts. First, I argue that Pardo’s criticisms do not
2. Rafael I. Pardo, The Undue Hardship Thicket: On Access to Justice, Procedural
Noncompliance, and Pollutive Litigation in Bankruptcy, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2101 (2014).
3. See id. at 2107.
4. Id. at 2105.
5. See id. at 2173.
6. Jason Iuliano, An Empirical Assessment of Student Loan Discharges and the Undue
Hardship Standard, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 495 (2012).
7. See id. at 505 (finding that, of the debtors who filed an adversary proceeding for
discharging their student loans, 25% received a full discharge and 14% received a partial
discharge).
8. Id.
9. See id. at 523–24.
10. Pardo, supra note 2, at 2124–42.
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undermine my study’s conclusions. Second, I argue that the widespread
pessimism regarding the current undue hardship standard should be
tempered.
Admittedly, the undue hardship standard is neither a perfect nor even
a particularly reasonable provision.11 However, the standard is also not
an impossible hurdle. There is hope in the current system, and as flawed
as the undue hardship standard is, one must be careful not to present an
unduly pessimistic view. Doing so will only serve to discourage many
student loan debtors from seeking the bankruptcy relief they need.
I. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS FROM THE 2012 AMERICAN
BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL STUDY
Student loans are unusual. Whereas the vast majority of debts are
automatically discharged in bankruptcy, student loans are not.12 Instead,
they are dischargeable only if the debtor can show—through an adversary
proceeding—that repaying the loans would inflict an “undue hardship.”13
My 2012 article examined how bankruptcy judges apply the undue
hardship standard.14 I sought to test the veracity of the traditional
narrative surrounding student loan discharges—a narrative that maintains
that it is all but impossible for people to discharge their student loans in
bankruptcy. The data showed that this view of the undue hardship
standard is not empirically supported.15 Several key findings led me to
that conclusion.
First, as mentioned above, nearly 40% of debtors who attempted to
discharge their student loans received either a partial or full discharge.16
Second, debtors with attorneys fared no better than pro se debtors.17
Third, judges applied the undue hardship standard in a relatively
consistent manner.18 And fourth, an astonishingly small number of
student loan debtors ever seek a discharge.19 More specifically, I
calculated that, each year, more than 200,000 student loan debtors file for
bankruptcy, but only a few hundred of those ever file an adversary
proceeding to attempt to discharge their loans.20 This means that more
than 99% of the bankruptcy filers with student loans do not request a
11. As I discuss in my earlier article, it makes no sense that debtors must meet the undue
hardship standard to discharge private student loans. See Iuliano, supra note 6, at 524 n.92.
12. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012).
13. Id.
14. See Iuliano, supra note 6.
15. See id. at 522–23.
16. See id. at 505.
17. See id. at 507, 516 (finding that 43% of pro se debtors received a discharge but only
38% of debtors with attorneys received a discharge).
18. See id. at 512–22.
19. See id. at 522.
20. See id. at 505.
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discharge from the court. That is a startling statistic, and it is even more
troubling given the fact that many of these debtors who do not attempt to
discharge their student loans are in worse financial positions than those
who were able to successfully discharge their student loans.21
These findings led me to conclude that the criticisms directed at the
undue hardship standard are overstated. Although the standard is far from
ideal, it is not nearly as oppressive as commonly believed. The real issue
is that the vast majority of people who would satisfy the undue hardship
standard never petition the courts for a discharge.22 Ultimately, I
recommended that consumer bankruptcy advocates identify bankruptcy
filers who would likely meet the undue hardship requirement and
encourage them to pursue discharges.23 Contrary to conventional
wisdom, judges are willing to grant discharges. The problem is that few
people ever ask.
Recently, even ECMC recognized the inaccuracy of the traditional
narrative. In 2012, at the time my study was published, ECMC’s website
presented a very bleak picture, claiming that student loans are “rarely”
discharged.24 Today, that very same webpage forgoes discussion of
probabilities and adopts a more measured, factual position. It merely
reports, “Congress intended that discharge for undue hardship be reserved
for individuals facing more than the financial hardship that accompanies
all bankruptcies. . . . [I]t is up to the bankruptcy court to determine if your
situation meets the legal standard set by Congress.”25 In short, ECMC
knows that it can no longer credibly advance a narrative of hopelessness.
II. MY RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR PARDO’S CRITIQUE
In The Undue Hardship Thicket, Pardo disputes my contention that
the traditional narrative is incorrect.26 He critiques my study along a
variety of dimensions and argues that my conclusions are not supported
by the data.27 In this Part, I respond.

21. See id. at 523–24 (estimating that an additional sixty-nine thousand student loan debtors
in bankruptcy would have had a good chance of discharging their student loans).
22. Id.
23. See id. at 525.
24. Ron Lieber, Last Plea on School Loans: Proving a Hopeless Future, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
31, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/01/business/shedding-student-loans-in-bankruptcyis-an-uphill-battle.html.
25. Bankruptcy and Student Loans, ECMC, https://www.ecmc.org/borrowers/bankruptcyand-student-loans.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2016).
26. Pardo, supra note 2, at 2126–42.
27. See id.
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A. Sample Composition
Pardo raises two primary criticisms of my study’s sample. First, he
claims that I failed to consider all cases from the relevant time period.
Second, he states that my search methods for collecting the test sample
resulted in undercounting. I reject both of these claims in the following
sections.
1. Time Period
With respect to the sample’s time period, Pardo critiques my study for
“omit[ting] adversary proceedings filed in 2007 in connection with cases
that were commenced prior to 2007.”28 He notes that excluding these
proceedings could be problematic because “circumstances surrounding
the claim of undue hardship for the delaying filers could be very different
than those of the non-delaying filers.”29
This problem, however, does not apply to my study. My sample
included adversary proceedings initiated in 2007, regardless of the year
in which the underlying bankruptcy case was filed. In fact, a full 40% of
the debtors in my sample filed for bankruptcy prior to 2007. I did not
break down this figure in my original article, so to the extent there was
any ambiguity, I use this opportunity to clarify the record.
2. Undercounting
Another criticism Pardo advances is that my sample significantly
undercounted the true number of student loan discharge attempts.30
Specifically, Pardo argues that my search methodology was flawed and
that I should have searched for student loan cases either by using
PACER’s Nature of Suit (NOS) Code or by individually searching each
bankruptcy court’s PACER database for adversary proceedings.31 I look
at both of these alternatives, in turn.
Pardo correctly claims that an NOS search would have revealed
some student loan proceedings that my search methodology failed to
identify.32 However, at the time I gathered my sample, PACER did not
have the option to conduct such a search. In his article, Pardo
speculates that this may have been the case,33 so I write here merely to
confirm that point. Given the inability to perform an NOS search at
28. Id. at 2126–27.
29. Id. at 2127.
30. See id. at 2129 (writing that my study’s “search approach likely resulted in a significant
undercounting of student-loan adversary proceedings filed in 2007”).
31. See id. at 2127–29.
32. See id. at 2128.
33. See id. (noting that “it may be that the search functionality by NOS Code was
unavailable during the Iuliano Study”).
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the time of my study, this option was not a viable alternative.
Pardo’s second recommendation would have required searching each
of the ninety-one bankruptcy court databases for all the adversary
proceedings filed in 2007 and then individually reviewing every search
result. In theory, this was a possible option. However, because nearly fifty
thousand adversary proceedings were filed in 2007,34 this would have
been an extremely time-intensive task and, as I discuss below, would
have been unlikely to alter my findings. Given the limitations of Pardo’s
alternative search methodologies, the Party Name search that I employed
was the most practical option.35
That said, because the methodologies do yield a different number of
search results, it is worth examining whether my decision to search via
the Party Name field could have influenced my findings. An NOS
search—which as noted, only became possible after my study—reveals
that 445 student loan debtors filed undue hardship proceedings during
2007.36 As I discussed in my original study, given the nature of a Party
Name search, my search terms were not designed to identify every case.37
Unlike the NOS search, which searches all filings, my search
methodology included only cases involving ECMC and the ten largest
student loan creditors.38 This search process identified 213 debtors.39
Restricting the search parameters in this manner would necessarily omit
cases.40 However, given that these ten creditors hold more than 70% of
the student loan debt, I argued that the omissions would not skew my
findings and that the sample would be representative of student loan
adversary proceedings generally.41
Pardo disagrees with this assessment. He is concerned that the omitted
cases systematically differ from my sample cases along dimensions that
affect discharge success.42 In particular, he argues that my sample is
biased because it likely excluded a disproportionate number of cases
involving the U.S. Department of Education (DOE).43 Pardo writes that
34. JAMES C. DUFF, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2007 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 35 (2008) (noting that there were 49,976 adversary proceedings filed
in 2007).
35. See Iuliano, supra note 6, at 502 (“Given PACER’s deficiencies, the most efficient way
to gather a nationwide sample of student loan debtors was to limit the search by specific education
loan holders.”).
36. See Pardo, supra note 2, at 2129 n.176.
37. See Iuliano, supra note 6, at 502.
38. Id. at 504–05 (noting that the creditors in the study held 71.2% of student loan debt).
39. Id. at 503 (noting that, because four debtors filed separate complaints, there were 217
adversary proceedings but only 213 unique debtors).
40. Id.
41. See id. at 504–05.
42. See Pardo, supra note 2, at 2129–31.
43. Id. at 2130 (noting that my study “omitted a search for adversary proceedings involving
the U.S. Department of Education”).
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“[t]his is quite significant given the Pardo–Lacey Study’s finding that the
amount of debt discharged was negatively correlated with the
involvement of the DOE as a party in the adversary proceeding.”44
This concern is unwarranted for three reasons. First, even though I did
not search specifically for adversary proceedings involving the DOE, the
DOE was nonetheless a creditor in 28% of the cases in my sample. By
comparison, in the sample from the Pardo–Lacey Study, the DOE was
involved in approximately 33% of student loan cases.45 This small
difference suggests that my search protocol did not systematically
undercount DOE cases.
The second reason this objection fails is that, in my sample, there was no
difference in discharge rates between cases involving the DOE and those not
involving the DOE. A nonparametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test indicated that
any discharge differences between the two groups (DOE involvement and
no DOE involvement) are not statistically significant (p = 0.60).46
Admittedly, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence; therefore,
the Wilcoxon rank-sum test does not permit me to claim that no
difference exists. However, I subsequently conducted an equivalence
test—a statistical test that does allow for that inference.47 The
equivalence test showed that the rates of success for the two populations
are likely quite similar.48
A third and final point further supports my contention that any omitted
DOE cases do not bias my results. In my sample, DOE involvement was
positively correlated with the amount of debt discharged. This means that
student loan debtors actually fared better in cases in which the DOE was
a creditor. Specifically, the mean percentage of debt discharged in
adversary proceedings involving the DOE is 37%, but it is only 32% in
cases in which the DOE is not a party. Accordingly, to the extent my
sample omitted any cases involving the DOE, it biased the findings
against my conclusions, not—as Pardo argues—in favor of them.
44. Id. at 2130–31.
45. Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 1, at 209. The Pardo–Lacey
Study identified all student loan cases in the state of Washington from 2002 through 2006. Id. at
202.
46. This is in contrast to the Pardo–Lacey Study in which there was a statistical difference.
See id. at 222.
47. Specifically, I employed the two one-sided tests approach.
48. This statistical technique is essentially the reverse of a normal t-test. For this
equivalence test, the null hypothesis holds that there is a statistically significant difference
between the discharge rates in the two populations, and the alternative hypothesis holds that there
is no significant difference in discharge rates when the DOE is involved versus when it is not.
Setting the null hypothesis to a difference of twenty percentage points, this analysis yields
significant results (p < 0.05) on both sides of the test. See infra Table 1 in Appendix A. In other
words, I am quite confident that the means of both populations fall within twenty percentage
points of each other. The sample, unfortunately, is too small to make a more fine-grained
assessment. See infra Table 1 in Appendix A.
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Therefore, if Pardo’s claim that I undercounted DOE cases is correct, it
only serves to strengthen my argument that many more debtors can
successfully navigate the student loan discharge process.
B. Study Design
Pardo advances several critiques regarding the design of my study. In
this Section, I address three of his primary contentions. First, I explain
why the coding bias that he alleges exists did not skew the results in favor
of my conclusion. Next, I examine the impact of using the 2007 Health
and Human Services poverty guidelines rather than the 2008 guidelines.
Finally, I defend my interpretation of the good faith requirement.
1. Default Judgments and Dismissals
Pardo argues that I inappropriately coded default judgments against
the student loan creditor as providing relief and adversary proceeding
dismissals as yielding no relief.49 Pardo’s objection raises an important
point: default judgments do not always produce relief, and dismissals
sometimes do. Indeed, when deciding how to code such outcomes, I
considered—but ultimately rejected—this concern. For the following
three reasons, I believe my decision is the correct one.
First, in the vast majority of cases, my assumptions—that a default
judgment reduces liability and that a dismissal results in no relief—are
likely to be true. Although there are certainly exceptions,50 a default
judgment against a creditor is generally a favorable judgment for a
debtor.51 Likewise, a dismissal will normally not lead to relief for a
debtor.52
Second, the assumptions used in my coding heavily bias the data
against my conclusions. If I substituted Pardo’s assumptions (i.e., some
of the default judgments yielded no relief, and some of the dismissals
resulted in relief) for my own, the data would show that a substantially
higher percentage of student loan debtors who file an adversary
proceeding actually receive a discharge. This is the case because my
sample contained far more dismissals than default judgments (ninety
versus four).53 Accordingly, under Pardo’s assumptions, there would be
49. Pardo, supra note 2, at 2131–32 (arguing that my conclusions “rest on potentially
inaccurate coding protocols for relief”).
50. See FED. R. CIV. P. 55(c) & 60(b) (rules for setting aside a default judgment and grounds
for relief from a default judgment).
51. See Default Judgment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “default
judgment” as “[a] judgment entered against a defendant who has failed to plead or otherwise
defend against the plaintiff's claim”).
52. See Dismissal, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “dismissal” as the
“[t]ermination of an action or claim without further hearing”).
53. Iuliano, supra note 6, at 500 n.30.
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significantly more dismissals that resulted in relief than default
judgments that yielded no relief. On balance, this would indicate that an
even higher percentage of student loan debtors obtain relief. Therefore, if
Pardo’s critique were accurate, it would actually strengthen my argument
that many more student loan debtors could successfully obtain relief.
Third, my coding protocol is sufficiently fine-grained to sort out many
of the dismissals that ultimately resulted in relief. When advancing his
argument that I incorrectly coded dismissals, Pardo raises the possibility
that I failed to account for dismissals in which the proceeding was
dismissed for the purpose of allowing the debtor to take advantage of an
administrative discharge.54 Pardo points to the total and permanent
disability program as one salient example.55 Although I did not discuss
this particular point in the study, my coding did account for this outcome.
When an administrative discharge that would completely discharge the
loan was stipulated in the court record, I coded the case as involving a
discharge.56
This situation occurred eight times. Those filings were normally titled
as “Agreed Order Discharging Student Loan Debt”57 or “Stipulation
Agreeing to Discharge Student Loan.”58 They generally contained a
provision stating that the parties reached an agreement, wherein the DOE
agreed to discharge the debtor’s student loan debt based on the debtor’s
“Total and Permanent Disability.”59 Although these are technically
voluntary dismissals that led to administrative remedies, I coded them as
involving a discharge of student loans. Given that the parties referred to
the outcome as a “discharge”60 and that there is no way to tell whether
these specific debtors would have been granted administrative relief if

54. Pardo, supra note 2, at 2131.
55. Id.
56. There is, admittedly, a sentence in the original article that could have justifiably led
Pardo to conclude that I failed to take this step. Specifically, the sentence reads, “I categorize
administrative remedies as a form of ‘no relief’ in the rest of this article.” Iuliano, supra note 6,
at 506. This sentence, however, was in the context of a discussion about long-term administrative
remedies (such as income-based repayment plans) and was meant to refer only to that set of
administrative remedies. Accordingly, a clearer version of this sentence would read, “I categorize
these administrative remedies as a form of ‘no relief’ in the rest of this article.”
57. See, e.g., Agreed Order Discharging Student Loan Debt at 1, Savage v. U.S. Dep’t of
Educ., No. 2:06-bk-72392 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. Oct. 24, 2008).
58. See, e.g., Stipulation Agreeing to Discharge Student Loan, Loudy v. Educ. Credit
Mgmt. Corp., No. 05-14140 EEB (Bankr. D. Colo. May 26, 2009).
59. See, e.g., Agreed Order Discharging Student Loan Debt, supra note 57, at 1; see also
Stipulation Agreeing to Discharge Student Loan, supra note 58 (showing that the parties agree to
a dismissal and noting that “[t]he debtor’s application for an administrative discharge has been
approved by the U.S. Department of Education”).
60. Stipulation Agreeing to Discharge Student Loan, supra note 58.
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they had not filed an adversary proceeding,61 I believe this is the best
possible coding protocol. For the above three reasons, my coding
decisions with respect to dismissals and default judgments are unlikely to
bias any of my findings.
2. Poverty Guidelines
Pardo also criticizes my use of the 2007 Health and Human Services
poverty guidelines to calculate the percentage of debtors in my sample
who were living below the poverty line. He observes that, because my
sample is drawn from 2007, I should have used the 2008 Health and
Human Services poverty guidelines rather than the 2007 guidelines.62
Pardo is correct; this is an error on my part. The error, however, is
completely inconsequential.
Annual changes in the poverty threshold are extremely small. For
instance, the 2007 poverty line for a single-person household in the fortyeight contiguous states and the District of Columbia was $10,210.63 In
2008, that figure was $10,400.64 Given the minor differences, it should
not be surprising that updating my data to reflect the 2008 values had no
effect on any of my findings. In fact, regardless of whether I used the
2007 or 2008 figures, 27% of the debtors in my sample were living below
the poverty line.
3. Good Faith Requirement
In his article, Pardo claims that I “made unsubstantiated, patently
incorrect assertions regarding the undue hardship doctrine.”65 He believes
that my discussion of the good faith prong of the Brunner test shows that
my study lacked “the proper lens to carefully and critically analyze the
primary materials it reviewed to gather the data upon which its findings
are based.”66
Specifically, Pardo disagrees with my statement that a debtor’s
“[c]urrent employment status is irrelevant as to whether the debtor made
a good faith effort to repay student loans in the past.”67 In advancing this
argument, Pardo begins by citing to a case from the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit that states, “Good faith is measured by the debtor’s
61. In theory, there should be no difference. However, from reading complaints, it is clear
that some people who had previously attempted to procure administrative discharges were only
granted them after filing an adversary proceeding.
62. Pardo, supra note 2, at 2133–34.
63. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., THE 2007 HHS POVERTY GUIDELINES 3 (2007).
64. The 2008 HHS Poverty Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://aspe.hhs.gov/2008-hhs-poverty-guidelines (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
65. Pardo, supra note 2, at 2134.
66. See id. at 2134–35.
67. See id. at 2134; Iuliano, supra note 6, at 517.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol68/iss1/7

10

Iuliano: Student Loans and Surmountable Access-To-Justice Barriers

2016]

SURMOUNTABLE ACCESS-TO-JUSTICE BARRIERS

387

efforts to obtain employment, maximize income, and minimize
expenses.”68 He then writes that “[i]t goes without saying that a debtor
who actually is employed has made an effort to gain employment.”69
From this, Pardo concludes that employment status provides evidence of
good faith.
His conclusion, however, misses an important part of the case law.
When the court states that “efforts to obtain employment” indicate good
faith, it is referring to a specific type of effort—namely, effort directed
toward obtaining the appropriate kind of job.70 This is what courts mean
when they say “good faith effort.”71 Although a debtor who has a job has
likely made some effort to obtain that job, it does not follow that the
debtor has undertaken the good faith effort that courts require.72
For instance, imagine a law school graduate who takes a job as a
cashier at a fast food restaurant without ever applying for higher paying
legal jobs. This debtor has certainly made an effort to obtain a job.
However, he will be unable to convince any court that he has made a good
faith effort under the Brunner test.73 According to case law, current
employment status cannot indicate whether a debtor has made a good
faith effort to repay his loans. Other factors are determinative. Given the
courts’ interpretation of the Brunner test, my statement accurately reflects
the present state of the law.
This point aside, it is worth noting that this is another criticism that,
even if true, would have no bearing on any of my findings or conclusions.
The criticism is misdirected because I still used current employment
status in all of my calculations. Importantly, I never claimed that
68. Pardo, supra note 2, at 2135 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Educ.
Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Mason (In re Mason), 464 F.3d 878, 884 (9th Cir. 2006)).
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., In re Mason, 464 F.3d at 885 (holding that a debtor failed to establish good
faith in part due to his failure to seek full-time employment).
71. See, e.g., Roth v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Roth), 490 B.R. 908, 919 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 2013) (holding that a debtor made good faith efforts to obtain employment because she “1)
remained full-time employed until shortly before she filed Chapter 7, often working two jobs; 2)
used her job skills as productively as she could; and 3) lived frugally”); Gitsch v. Iowa Student
Loan Liquidity Corp. (In re Gitsch), 384 B.R. 555, 558 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2008) (inquiring as to
“whether the debtor has made a good faith effort to obtain employment”).
72. See, e.g., In re Roth, 490 B.R. at 919.
73. See Oyler v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Oyler), 397 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2005)
(“Choosing a low-paying job cannot merit undue hardship relief.”). The debtor must reasonably
attempt to maximize income even if this means procuring work in a field unrelated to the debtor’s
degree field. See In re Mason, 464 F.3d at 885 (finding no good faith where the debtor held only
one part-time job, made an insufficient job search given his free time, and did not reattempt the
bar exam); U.S. Dep’t of Educ. v. Gerhardt (In re Gerhardt), 348 F.3d 89, 93 (5th Cir. 2003)
(“[N]othing in the Bankruptcy Code suggests that a debtor may choose to work only in the field
in which he was trained, obtain a low-paying job, and then claim that it would be an undue
hardship to repay his student loans.”).
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employment status was immaterial to a court’s undue hardship
determination. Instead, I merely claimed that it better fit within two other
prongs of the Brunner test—whether the debtor has (1) a current inability
to repay his student loans or (2) a future inability to repay his student
loans.74 It seems evident that current employment status is a better
predictor of one’s current and future ability to repay than it is of one’s
past efforts to repay.
C. Recommendations
In my study, I concluded that each year there are tens of thousands
of debtors in bankruptcy who could successfully discharge their student
loans but for some reason never try.75 I argued that many of these
debtors should attempt to procure a discharge and that they should not
be deterred if they cannot afford an attorney. Those who find themselves
in such a situation should consider navigating the process pro se.
Pardo criticizes this recommendation as harmful and misguided. In
particular, he argues that highly experienced attorneys are beneficial in
obtaining discharges and that bankrupt debtors will be unable to
successfully litigate an adversary proceeding without the aid of
counsel.76
First, I do not dispute Pardo’s claim that highly experienced attorneys
can be beneficial. The Pardo–Lacey Study presented good reason to
believe such lawyers do procure discharges at higher rates than pro se
litigants.77 My claim, however, is not about this very small group of
highly experienced attorneys. Instead, it is about the entire group of
attorneys who represent debtors in student loan adversary proceedings.
Like my study, the Pardo–Lacey Study found no evidence that the
average student loan attorney improves discharge outcomes.78
In my sample, those debtors who represented themselves actually
fared slightly better than those debtors who hired an attorney, although
the difference was not statistically significant.79 Debtors with attorneys
discharged an average of 33% of their student loan debt, but pro se
litigants discharged an average of 35% of their student loan debt.80
Likewise, 43% of pro se litigants discharged some of their debt, but only
74. Courts routinely discuss employment status in the context of these other prongs. See,
e.g., White v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re White), Bankr. No. 07-41509, 2008 WL 5272508,
at *6 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2008).
75. Iuliano, supra note 6, at 524.
76. See Pardo, supra note 2, at 2140–42.
77. See Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 1, at 221–23.
78. See id. at 222 tbl.6 (showing that there was no statistically significant difference in the
percentage of debt discharged between those debtors who were “Represented by Counsel” and
those who were not).
79. See Iuliano, supra note 6, at 516 fig.5.
80. See id.
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38% of debtors with attorneys did the same.81
Furthermore, a comparison of the discharge rates of those debtors who
hired an attorney with those who did not suggests that the average
attorney does not contribute to a successful outcome.82 Specifically, a
Wilcoxon rank-sum test shows that the difference in discharge rates
between the two groups of debtors is not significant (p = 0.82) at
conventional levels. Additionally, an equivalence test reveals that the
difference, if any, between the two groups is likely to be rather small.83
This lack of significance holds even after controlling for other relevant
variables.84
Pardo seems to suggest that the Pardo–Lacey Study’s findings and my
own are incompatible.85 However, they are not. It is consistent to
maintain both that a small number of highly experienced attorneys
improve discharge outcomes and that attorneys, on average, do not
provide such benefit.
I do agree with Pardo on one point. It would be ideal for a debtor to
have a highly experienced attorney litigate the adversary proceeding.
Unfortunately, many debtors do not have this option. Given their poor
financial situations, debtors frequently must choose either to do nothing
or to attempt to litigate the case themselves. The claim I advanced in my
study is merely that debtors who do not have the funds to pay for a lawyer
are not at a clear disadvantage insofar as case outcome is concerned.86
They can litigate the case themselves just as successfully as if they had
hired an average attorney. Certainly, pro se litigants will have to expend
more time on the case than litigants with attorneys. However, the fact that
a debtor lacks an attorney does not mean that the chances of discharge
are reduced.
As I noted above, Pardo also raises a second point: most people are
incapable of litigating an adversary proceeding without the aid of
counsel.87 Although this is undoubtedly true of some debtors, it does not
appear to reflect the experiences of most debtors. My sample contains
numerous cases in which ordinary debtors prove they are quite capable
of successfully representing themselves in adversary proceedings.
Admittedly, pro se debtors demonstrate a wide range of competence in
their filings. But this is true even for those debtors who successfully
discharged their student loans. For instance, here is an excerpt from a
81. Id. at 501 n.34.
82. See id. at 520–21.
83. The means of the two groups are likely to be within fifteen percentage points of each
other (p < 0.05).
84. See Iuliano, supra note 6, at 520–21.
85. See Pardo, supra note 2, at 2124–30.
86. See Iuliano, supra note 6, at 516 fig.5 and text accompanying supra note 80.
87. See Pardo, supra note 2, at 2140–41.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 7

390

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

handwritten complaint filed by one successful pro se debtor:
After going to multiple Dr’s they ruled it a ‘epileptic
tendency’ becuz they could not figure out what was causing
the seizures. . . . I worked hard to find a the right Dr to do
more aggressive testing and found out that I don’t have
“Epilepsy” per say but that I will never be able to work on
computers, nor drive @ night, let alone disco dance w/ strobe
lights , or watch TV in the dark.88
When this woman initiated her adversary proceeding, she had
$36,640.39 in student loan debt.89 Despite the lack of professionalism in
her filings, the case was settled, and her debt was fully discharged.90 At
the other end of the spectrum, some debtors drafted complaints that
displayed substantial legal expertise. At times, these complaints were
even superior to those submitted by actual attorneys.91 These examples
certainly do not mean that every single debtor will be able to successfully
litigate an adversary proceeding without the aid of an attorney. However,
I never suggested as much. I merely argued that many debtors are capable
of successfully navigating the discharge process themselves, a fact that
the data strongly supports.
CONCLUSION
In The Undue Hardship Thicket, Pardo mounted an extended
challenge to my 2012 study. In this response, I have argued that his efforts
were unsuccessful. At times, Pardo’s criticisms advanced minor points
that, even if correct, would not undermine any of my study’s findings. At
other times, Pardo did highlight methodological choices with which all
scholars working on student loans must grapple. For these occasions, I
hope that this response has provided further justification for my
decisions. Ultimately, I believe that my analysis withstands all of Pardo’s
objections.
These points notwithstanding, Pardo’s broader project remains a
noteworthy contribution to the literature on student loans. By using an
88. See Complaint at 1, In re Green, No. 07-000198-RTB7 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Jan. 30, 2007).
This quotation is reproduced exactly as it appears in the original document. All mistakes and
symbols are in the complaint.
89. Id.
90. See Stipulated Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding at 1–2, In re Green, No. 2:07bk-00198-RTB (Bankr. D. Ariz. May 15, 2009). ECMC approved the loans for a conditional Total
and Permanent Disability discharge under federal regulations. Id.
91. See, e.g., Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Student Loans Under Bankruptcy
Reform Act (1998), 11 § U.S.C. 523(a)(8) (2012); Ginger Pennie v. Sallie Mae Educ. Trust, and
Servicing Corp., 05-09927-PCW7 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. Aug. 16, 2007). This pro se filing
demonstrates an excellent understanding of the Brunner test and provides the facts necessary to
build a strong case in favor of an undue hardship discharge.
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original dataset to showcase ECMC’s abusive tactics, he reveals
additional ways in which student loan debtors are disadvantaged. For
anyone evaluating potential reforms to the student loan bankruptcy
provisions, Pardo’s findings should be taken into consideration.
Despite our disagreements, I doubt that Pardo and I view the undue
hardship standard all that differently. We both agree that it is an
extremely flawed provision.92 Likewise, both of us hope that Congress
will reform the student loan discharge process but recognize that such
reform is unlikely to be forthcoming.93 Our main point of contention
appears to be over how best to work within the current system.
Specifically, we disagree over whether more student loan debtors who
have filed for bankruptcy should pursue student loan discharges. Pardo is
doubtful that many people can satisfy the undue hardship standard, but I
am optimistic.

92. For a strong argument in favor of eliminating the undue hardship standard for private
student loans, see Adam Levitin, The Examiners: Discharge Private Student Loans, but Federal
Loans Have Safety Net, WALL ST. J. (May 11, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/
2015/05/11/the-examiners-discharge-private-studentloans-but-federal-loans-have-safety-net.
93. See Pardo, supra note 2, at 2175 (concluding that “[a]t best, Congress might engage in
modest reform efforts. At worst, Congress will do nothing”). If Congress does want to reform the
student loan discharge process, there are many ways to improve the system. For instance, during
the last Congress, Jon Conyers introduced a bill that would allow bankruptcy judges to award
attorney’s fees to individual debtors when the creditor has engaged in abusive litigation. See
Stopping Abusive Student Loan Collection Practices in Bankruptcy Act of 2014, H.R. 4835, 113th
Cong. § 2 (2014). This provision would be an excellent way to reduce the abuses that Pardo
identified in his article. Alternatively, for a compelling argument that risk-based pricing of student
loans would increase people’s ability to repay their student loans, see Michael Simkovic, RiskBased Student Loans, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527, 529–31 (2013).
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APPENDIX A
TABLE 1: TWO ONE-SIDED TEST FOR EQUIVALENCE—PERCENTAGE OF
DEBT DISCHARGED WHEN THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION IS AND IS
NOT A CREDITOR
Mean (Percentage Discharged)
Variance
Observations
Pooled Variance
Hypothesized Mean Difference
df
t Stat
p-value (one-tailed)
p-value (two-tailed)

DOE Creditor
36.966
2132.8
58
2003.9
20
201
-2.094
0.019
0.037

DOE not Creditor
31.531
1952.9
145

-3.657
0.000

TABLE 2: TWO ONE-SIDED TEST FOR EQUIVALENCE—PERCENTAGE OF
DEBT DISCHARGED WHEN THE DEBTOR IS AND IS NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL
Mean (Percentage Discharged)
Variance
Observations
Pooled Variance
Hypothesized Mean Difference
df
t Stat
p-value (one-tailed)
p-value (two-tailed)

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol68/iss1/7

Counsel
32.691
2019.4
162
2009.4
15
201
-2.162
0.016
0.097

No Counsel
34.634
1968.8
41

-1.666
0.049
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